For safety critical complex systems, reliability and risk analysis are important design steps. Implementing these analyses early in the design stage can reduce costs associated with redesign and provide important information on design viability. In the past several years, various research methods have been presented in the design community to move reliability analysis into the early conceptual design stages. These methods all use a functional representation as the basis for reliability analysis. This paper asserts that, in non-nominal system states, the functional representation limits the scope of failure analysis. Specifically, when failures are modeled to propagate along energy, material, and signal (EMS) flows, a nominal-state functional model is insufficient for modeling all types of failures. To capture possible failure propagation paths, a function-based reliability method must consider all potential flows, and not be limited to the function structure of the nominal state. In this light, this paper introduces the Flow State Logic (FSL) method as a means for reasoning on the state of EMS flows that allows the assessment of failure propagation over potential flows that were not considered in a functional representation of a "nominally functioning" design. A liquid fueled rocket engine serves as a case study to illustrate the benefits of the methodology.
INTRODUCTION
There are significant advantages to conducting reliability analysis during product design, including decreased redesign time, improved quality and safety, and decreased manufacturing time [2] . Most reliability analysis techniques, however, require mature designs to provide meaningful information. To fully realize the aforementioned benefits, recent research efforts have focused on developing and applying reliability methods at the earliest, conceptual stages of design by using function-based system models as a basis for failure analysis [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
In their traditional use, these models intend to capture the transformation of energy, material and signal (EMS) flows within a system under operational or nominal conditions. This presents a fundamental limitation for function-based system models to be used for reliability analysis, which focuses not on the nominal, but almost completely on the failure design space. This paper asserts that configuration changes and environmental factors can cause a functional model, as designed, to no longer accurately represent the system in a failed state. Further, early design stage failure propagation analysis is hindered by a reliance on a static model for system representation. 
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a liquid is designed to flow from component A to component B. In a failed state, it is possible that the flow of the liquid may actually travel from B to A. Because of a reliance on a nominal behavior driven system model, many failure propagation analysis methods cannot capture this failure path accurately. Furthermore, the state of the functional model for a system will almost always be different after a failure has occurred in the system. Figure 1 shows the difference between the designed system and the system at a failed state. The effect of this type of failure was tragically seen when the space shuttle Columbia lost a heat tile due to foam impacting the wing, exposing the shuttle wing structure to significant heat during atmosphere reentry. The designed system as represented by the original functional model did not reflect the actual system state prior to failure. In this case, the path of failure propagation was along an energy flow path that was not identified in the initial representation.
These two simple examples illustrate the shortcoming of conceptual failure analysis when failure propagation is restricted to EMS flows driven by nominal operations. The technical challenge faced by designers is the difficulty of analyzing potential failures that propagate along unknown or unintended paths and assessing the effects of failure propagation on other elements of a system. In order to address this challenge, the interactions between design elements must be modeled and the effects of failure propagation along all potential paths should formally be analyzed. This paper presents a reasoning method based on the flow state that provides the designers with this capability.
Contributions
This paper asserts that a model of a system in a failed state may not exactly match the model of the system as it was designed to operate. If only the designed EMS flows in a system are considered as the paths for failure propagation, then failures propagating along new or different flow paths cannot be captured. The goal of this paper is to address the limitation of this nominal system behavior representation by tracking the state of all flows in a system. In this light, this paper introduces the Flow State Logic (FSL) method, which provides a method of logic reasoning based on EMS flows to capture failure propagation along paths that are not considered in the original design.
There are several advantages to implementing the FSL methodology presented in this paper. First, the state of the designed and potential EMS flows in a system can be classified using this methodology. Second, the ability to map the failure propagation along the non-nominal paths provides a way of analyzing failure scenarios that introduce new EMS flows to the system. When combined with other function-based failure propagation methods, FSL provides a complete representation of system state. The long-term intent of this work is that the FSL method be integrated with other early design failure propagation methods to provide robust analysis and decision making capability during early system design.
Overview
In the following sections, we first review the related work in reliability methods to summarize the current state of the art. To implement the FSL methodology introduced in this paper it is necessary to approach the function-flow relationship in a specific way, which will be presented next. The resulting flow characterizations allow for flow state failure analysis. With this groundwork in place, we then present the methodology of tracking failure propagation along failure-induced flow paths. To demonstrate the benefits of implementing the FSL methodology, a liquid fueled rocket engine example system is modeled using a failure identification and propagation analysis framework, and then with an integrated FSL methodology.
RELATED WORK
Reliability for Existing Designs Numerous methods exist for system level reliability analysis of mature designs. These methods use specific component and configuration information to derive the effect and likelihood of failures to provide designers with risk information. In particular, the three main reliability methods currently accepted in practice are FMEA, FTA and PRA. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a tool for analyzing risks in a system down to a desired component level fidelity. By linking the likely failure modes and the resulting system effect for each component, FMEA offers a designer a means to evaluate the overall reliability of the system [12] . Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an incident focused method that starts with an undesirable system event and then works backwards to define the contributing events that would lead to a higher-level event. FTA uses Boolean logic descriptors to combine all the possible events that may lead to a failed state and is represented in a tree structure [13] . Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) combines event sequencing diagrams and fault trees to develop a stochastic model of the overall system reliability [14, 15] . These methods can provide enormous information about system performance. However, they are limited to mature designs and are based on the use of historical failure data.
Function-Based Reliability Methods in Conceptual Design
The majority of design stage reliability methods use functional modeling as a basis for system representation and analysis. Functional modeling is a system representation method that was developed as a means to enhance the concept generation state of product design [16] . This method identifies specific functions that a product must accomplish and connects these functions in a block diagram with the EMS flows that are then transformed by the functions. Additionally, functional modeling had been used in reverse engineering methods such as the Force Flow Analysis [17, 18] . This method dissects products into components and the forces acting on and between components and finally into the functions that components embody. The Functional Basis was developed by Hirtz et al [19, 20] in order to avoid the use of designer specific function and flow descriptions, providing a standard taxonomy concept design. Because of the usefulness of functional modeling for system representation in early design, it has also been used as part of the system representation in some early design reliability methods.
The first method that proposed a function-based approach to failure analysis was the Function Failure Design Method (FFDM) by Tumer and Stone [9, 21] . In FFDM, the functional model is developed to represent the system design, which serves as a basis for generating configuration concepts of component implementations of function. Based on historical failure data for these types of components, it is then possible to establish likely failure modes for a given function. While useful, when using historical failure data for component information, configuration-specific failures are difficult to incorporate into the analysis, leading to failures that are limited to single independent faults.
Several other methods built upon the FFDM methodology. Hutcheson et al. presented a methodology to enable the design of health monitoring modules concurrently with system conceptual design in order to reveal, model, and eliminate associated risks and failures [4] . Additionally, Grantham et al. presented the Risk in Early Design (RED) method of formulating functional-failure likelihood and consequence based risk assessment classified high-risk to low-risk functionfailure combinations [5, 7] .
Connecting component failure and risk to a functional model for design stage reliability was also shown by Meshkat et al. using a commercial systems engineering tool, CORE [8] . Using this method, functional models are related to dynamic fault trees to correlate historic risk and failure mode data of components to implemented functions. As with pervious empirical approaches, model accuracy in this work is directly related to depth and applicability of historical data.
Conceptual Failure Propagation Analysis
A limitation of these methods is the static nature of the failure analysis results. To overcome this limitation, other work has focused on including the propagation of failure in the analysis. As a direct extension, the failure propagation method introduced by Krus and Grantham-Lough [5] builds upon the FFDM and RED [7] methods to develop failure propagation mapping based on historical data using a functional model for system representation. This method adapted the element of "common interfaces" from change prediction [22] to apply to the functional level. This method explicitly defines failures as propagating along the designed flow paths.
In addition, Wang and Jin [11] present a Bayesian network analysis tool for evaluating the properties of function structures based on dependencies between flows and functions. In this method, the causation relationship is identified between a flow and every functional failure for each identified high-level function. Failure propagation is analyzed using a Function Event Network of all possible causation relationships in the function structure. This type of approach allows for a probabilistic analysis by applying a statistical reliability to the failure of each function in the function structure. An extension of this work is the Conceptual Stress and Conceptual Strength Interference Theory (CSCSIT) method by Huang and Jin [3] , where the conceptual strength of a function is the ability of a function to continue to operate while under normal energy, material and signal (EMS) flows. Conceptual stresses are the EMS flows in the function structure. The application of interference theory is used to define functional faults as when the output flow from a function is out of a specified normal range. To address the motivating issue of this paper, the previous two methods would require specifying normal ranges for every flow within the system at every state.
Finally, the Function Failure Identification and Propagation (FFIP) framework was introduced by Kurtoglu and Tumer [1, 6] as a design stage method for reasoning about failures based on the mapping between components, functions, and nominal and off-nominal behavior. The goal of the FFIP method is also to identify failure propagation paths, mapping component failure states to function health. However, this approach does not rely on a historical database but instead uses a failure simulation method for determining fault propagation paths and the risks associated with them, and provides the designer with the possibility of analyzing functional and component failures and reasoning about their effects downstream in a design based on their nominal and failed state behavior. In this paper, FFIP is selected as the basis for failure analysis, and is explained in more detail next. The FSL method introduced in this paper is then integrated with FFIP to show its utility and potential benefits as an extension to FFIP. The Function Failure Logic (FFL) reasoner from FFIP and the FSL method presented here can provide designers with a more complete picture of system reliability.
Function-Failure Identification and Propagation (FFIP)
FFIP follows a basic set of steps summarized as follows. Figure 3 illustrates part of the FFL reasoner for the "actuate electrical energy" function that is embodied by a generalized "relay" component. This method has been extended for identifying failure propagation paths in hardware and software systems [2] as well as a tool for design decision making [6] .
However, as with the other methods reviewed, FFIP is limited to failure propagation along pre-identified EMS flow paths. To address this limitation we next present the Flow State Logic (FSL) methodology for capturing failure propagation along EMS flows not identified in the original design.
FLOW STATE LOGIC METHODOLOGY

Approach
This paper asserts that failure events can often lead to unanticipated Energy, Material, and Signal (EMS) flows in a system. If failure propagation is assumed to follow EMS flow paths then a complete failure analysis of a design must include potential flows. From a failure standpoint, any flow between components and from components is possible. Also any flow from the environment to the component is also possible. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between designed flows and non-designed, or potential flows. Figure 4 illustrates the difference between designed flows and potential flows for a few simple systems.
Non-designed flows are the cause and/or effect of certain failure events. To capture the possibility of failure propagation of these potential flows, the Flow State Logic reasoner identifies the state of any flow in the system of interest for any given system state. To begin the discussion, it is first necessary to define the concept of a flow's state, which is to be differentiated from a flow's actual value. Flow states can be separated as one normal state representing the designed flow and three states representing non-nominal flow. These states are:
1. Normal Flow-Flow is consistent with the original design 2. New Flow-Flow exists but was not designed to exist 3. No Flow -Flow does not exist but was designed to exist 4. Reversed Flow -All aspects except direction of flow are as designed
The state of "No Flow" was captured in [5] as a function failure but is included here for completeness. By categorizing the flow states of all flows that appear in a system, and using a critical event simulation, it is possible to identify the failures that propagate along both designed and potential EMS flow paths.
Flow State Logic
FFIP framework uses a Function Failure Logic (FFL) reasoner to capture the health of functions embodied by components; however it does not capture the state of flows between components. To map failure propagation along new system EMS flows, the Flow State Logic (FSL) reasoner has been developed and is introduced here to provide more complete and accurate results about the state of failures.
The two reasoner roles are differentiated in Figure 5 . The logic of both FFL and FSL operates on the inputs and outputs of component behavioral models called ports. The ports are alphabetically labeled in Figure 5 . While the FFL reasoner evaluates the input and output ports (A, B, and C in Figure 5 ) of the Behavioural Model (BM), the FSL reasoner evaluates the ports between BM's (B and D in Figure 5 ). The use of ports can be found in other literature which have outlined the general types of designed ports [23, 24] . In addition to these earlier defined port types, an input and output port for potential flows is included in this methodology. The FFL and FSL reasoners read these port values to determine function health and flow state respectively. The FSL reasons on both the designed and potential flows in a system. Figure 6 shows the logic used by the FSL for potential and designed flows. The Flow State Logic for designed flows evaluates the output and input ports "A.1" and "B.1". The example potential flow logic evaluates the environmental output port "E_P.1" and potential component input port "A_P.1".
Propagation-Based Behavioral Models
To accommodate the addition of the FSL reasoner, the behavioral model of a system must incorporate two features. One is the addition of a model element that corresponds to the environment around the system. This environment block is the source for new flows created during critical scenarios. The foam impacting the Columbia shuttle heat tile would be an example of a new material flow, the source of which would be the environment block for the wing system model. Previous methods of defining component behavior identify the relationship between known input and output flows based on component mode [1, 6] . To be flexible enough to analyze failure scenarios with new unknown flow types the behavioral models must be approached differently. This method uses a systematic approach to flow propagation to create component behavioral models. This is done by establishing a relationship between the component behavior mode and the propagation characteristics of a flow. The types of flows used in this method are the secondary level of flow as specified by the Functional Basis [19, 20] , and summarized in Table 1 For a component, the behavioral model is created by defining the relationship between designed input and output EMS flows based on component mode. Then for each type of potential flow that is considered, a designer specifies the critical level at which a component mode would change. If a critical level exists, then the component mode change is specified. Finally, some components absorb flows and do not propagate to other system components. Therefore, the Boolean options of propagation or no propagation are specified for each potential flow type.
For example, a generic electric motor is nominally designed to have an input flow of electrical energy and an output flow of rotational energy. In developing the behavioral model of this component, the potential flow of liquid material to this component should be considered. Based on designer knowledge, the behavioral model represents that the mode of this component will change to a failed state with a low level of liquid material. Also this component has no capacity to store a liquid material so the behavioral model would reflect that liquid material would propagate to other components. This systematic approach can be taken with each type of flow to determine component behavior to potential flows.
APPLICATION TO LIQUID-FUELED ROCKET ENGINE DESIGN
This section applied the FSL method to the conceptual design for a liquid-fueled rocket to illustrate the resulting benefits to failure analysis and propagation mapping. The goal of this design is to combine fuel and oxidizer in a controlled fashion and provide thrust for a higher-level system. Liquid fueled rockets are used extensively for spacecraft applications. Physically this system stores a set amount of fuel and oxidizer in a liquid state. By controlling the combustion of these two fluids in a reaction chamber, thrust is provided for the larger system. To control and monitor the continuous chemical reaction a series of sensors and a software controller component must be included.
Initial Conceptual Failure Framework: FFIP
The FFIP framework is used for simulating failures and analyzing the impact of failures on the rocket engine design example [1, 2, 6] . The FFIP approach begins with creating a functional model for the system. Figure 7 represents an early stage functional model of the liquid fuel rocket. After the functional model is established a configuration flow graph (CFG) is created based on embodying functions into generic components. As can be seen from Figure 8 , this design includes a software controller to regulate valves based on command signals. Included in the CFG is a block identified as the environment that this system operates within. This block represents an environmental behavioral model that can interact with components within the system through potential and designed EMS flows. After using the FFIP framework for system representation, the Function Failure Logic (FFL) modules for each system function are created. The combined FFL reasoner modules provide function health states for each component based on behavioral model inputs and outputs. The presented FSL method is next applied to extend the scope of this analysis.
FSL Augmentation
By focusing on a small section of this design the benefits of applying this methodology can be more clearly demonstrated. Because the FSL methodology provides flow state information for all flows in a system, and only a limited section of this system is presented here. Figure 9 represents the specific components being considered, namely, the Fuel Valve and Fuel Line including potential system flows. The potential flows are created as a background process in the simulation but are shown here for clarity. In order to create the behavioral model for each component the designer must first specify the designed behavior based on discrete modes of the component. To address both the designed behavior and the behavior associated with new flows, the designer must answer the following three questions for each of the EMS flows identified in Table 1: 1. What qualitative level (zero, low, high) for each flow is necessary to change the mode of the component? (This is the critical level.) 2. Considering each flow individually, will that flow be propagated to nominally connected components? (Components are nominally connected through designed EMS flows.) 3. How will each flow at its critical level affect component mode?
The answers to these three questions are used to derive the behavior model for each component.
The behavior model indicates the values for EMS flows at input and output ports based on the component mode. There is a distinction made between the designed and potential ports in that, a component might have a different behavior if a flow is received through the designed port rather than the potential port for the same type of flow. To determine behavior, potential flows are considered to come in contact with the physical geometry of a component. Table 2 shows a summary of characteristics for the Fuel Valve in response to these questions. Tables such as the one shown in Table 2 assist in creating behavioral models for potential flows for the Fuel Valve and Fuel Line generalized components.
The benefit of using the FFIP framework is that fault scenarios can be simulated and the resulting failure propagation can be identified. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate two failure scenarios to demonstrate the effect of including FSL in this failure analysis method.
In the first scenario, some event causes a new flow of Acoustic Energy (at a low level) to flow from the environment to the Fuel Valve. (For clarity, Acoustic Energy in this analysis is a significant vibration.) In the simulation, the potential flow arc connecting the Environment block entering the Fuel Valve is changed so that the type is "Acoustic Energy" and the value is "Low." This flow is an input for the behavioral model of the Fuel Valve. Based on the behavioral model there is no resulting failure in the Fuel Valve component nor loss of the "Regulate Fuel" function. As defined in the behavioral model (see Table  2 ) the fuel valve tends to propagate the potential flow types of Acoustic Energy. An assumption for this simple example is that when flows are propagated, they are propagated to connected components. 
Results and Insights
The results of simulating the two critical scenarios illustrate the potential benefits of the Flow State Logic reasoning in failure propagation analysis. The results are summarized in Table 3 and Table 4 . The information that is gained by using the FFIP method is limited to the health of functions. By including Flow State Logic, the state of all flows in the system are known. Information on flow state is also used for failure propagation mapping. The first scenario examined the effects of a significant vibration energy affecting a component in the system. This methodology identified the failure path when the new EMS flow was introduced into the system. The state and component effects of this new flow are represented using this method. With the inclusion of probabilities of flow occurrence and component effect the associated risk of this type of failure could be calculated for this type of event.
FFIP Results
The second scenario examined the effect of introducing some unknown solid material to the fuel line. This could reflect the fuel line being pinched closed by a heavy object. The flow between the Fuel Valve and Fuel Line is captured as being in a failed state with the FSL reasoner. This type of fault would not have been identified without the inclusion of the FSL reasoner. In previous methods failures were assumed to propagate along and in the direction of designed EMS flows. In this simple example it was shown that a flow can be blocked, which would propagate failure in the opposite direction of the designed flow. Because the FSL reasons on the input and output ports of the Fuel Line and Fuel Valve respectively, this backward flow failure can be captured.
Finally, it must be noted that the creation of behavioral models based on propagation behavior in this method is more elaborate then in previous methods such as FFIP. This represents a difficulty in both analysis time and necessary knowledge. Ways to alleviate this difficulty are addressed as part of future work.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Most of the recent design stage reliability methods use functional modeling for system representation. For failure analysis it is assumed that failures propagate along energy, material, and signal (EMS) flow paths identified in the functional model. For a number of significant failures, the original functional model of the designed system does not include EMS flows that exist during system failure. These new flows may originate from failed components such as a leak or may be introduce from the system's environment. To address this issue, a method of identifying flow state for potential flows is presented, namely, the Flow State Logic (FSL) methodology, and integrated with prior work on failure propagation analysis. In conjunction with a thorough, propagation-focused behavioral model of components, failures that propagate from unanticipated EMS flows were identified. This paper focused on using a small portion of a liquid fueled rocket case study. This simplification was beneficial for presenting the fundamentals of the methodology. Future work will expand the analysis to the entire design. This presents a challenge in modeling subsystem interaction that should be addressed when the analysis is scaled to the whole system. A related challenge is to address the severity of failures with respect to one another within subsystems and across the system. In determining how new EMS flows propagate from different components, two avenues of exploration are possible. The basis for this method is that EMS flows exist both as designed and as possibilities. Along this line, Monte Carlo testing of the effect of flow propagation between components might provide a breadth of failure impact. This approach might be considered a bottom-up approach to determine how new flows propagate. Alternatively, discrete event simulations of known system failures could be used to direct new flow propagation. This would be a top-down approach and would provide significant detail for each particular failure scenario.
An area that has yet to be addressed in this research is the timing of failure propagation. So far failure simulations use discrete sequential events without respect to time intervals [25] . Future work must address the issue of timing to adequately analyze the electromechanical and software systems concurrently.
The Flow State Logic method presented here was used with a specific failure propagation analysis method, namely the Function Failure Identification and Propagation (FFIP) analysis framework [1] . Application and comparison of other methods represents an area of further research. Finally, to address the difficulty of behavioral model creation we recommend the creation of component libraries for specific design areas as has been useful with other methods [26] .
